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NOTE
A JURY OF YOUR [REDACTED]: THE RISE AND
IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
Leonardo Mangat†
Since their relatively recent beginnings in 1977, anonymous juries have been used across a litany of cases: organized crime, terrorism, murder, sports scandals, police killings,
and even political corruption. And their use is on the rise. An
anonymous jury is a type of jury that a court may empanel in
a criminal trial; if one is used, then information that might
otherwise identify jurors is withheld from the parties, the public, or some combination thereof, for varying lengths of time.
Though not without its benefits, anonymous juries raise
questions regarding a defendant’s presumption of innocence,
the public’s right to an open trial, the broad discretion afforded
to judges, and the impacts of anonymity on juror decisionmaking. In fact, one mock jury experiment found that anonymous jurors returned approximately 15% more guilty verdicts
than their non-anonymous counterparts. The anonymous jury
is unquestionably a potent tool that affords a court great flexibility to meet the exigencies of a trial head on. But its extraordinary characteristics counsel care in its empanelment.
By adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach to anonymous juries and requiring reasoned verdicts when they are used,
anonymous juries may yet become an “inspired, trusted, and
effective” instrument of justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The jury is part and parcel of our legal tradition.1 Since
“time out of mind,”2 juries—a group of people empowered to
decide facts and render verdicts3—were used in England before
finding purchase first in the Colonies, and then in the United
States.4 The jury, like other aspects of the trial, has witnessed
its share of innovations throughout time.5 Some innovations
trace their genesis to the Founding.6 Others claim descent
from the changing views of American society.7 The anonymous
jury, however, is of recent vintage.8 A group of nameless—
1
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by
Jury.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.”). Interestingly, the Constitution contained no specific provision for a
jury in civil trials. At least one Founding Father contended that the absence of a
specific provision did not mean that the right was entirely abolished. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
2
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349–50.
3
Jury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
4
BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM 3 (2017).
5
See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT
66–70 (2007) (discussing the historical development in the way jurors are selected
from the community).
6
See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 32–36 (1986)
(discussing a colonial jury’s involvement in developing the idea of freedom of the
press).
7
See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at 71–73 (noting the shift towards
jury representativeness as an ideal in the years following the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
8
See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In
Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 457–58 (1999)
(“[In 1977] a federal trial judge in the Southern District of New York empaneled the
first fully anonymous jury in American history.”). The Ninth Circuit, however,
anonymized some juror information before the seventies. Johnson v. United
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potentially featureless9—people sit in judgment and mete out
verdicts, in apparent contradiction to our democratic ideals of a
free and open society. Since 1977, when the first anonymous
jury was empaneled in a federal court in New York,10 they have
been used across a litany of cases: organized crime,11 terrorism,12 murder,13 sporting scandals,14 police killings,15 and
even gubernatorial corruption.16 And their use is on the rise.17
An anonymous jury is a type of jury that a court, upon its own
or the parties’ motion, may choose to empanel in a criminal
trial; if one is used, information that might identify jurors is
withheld from the parties or the public for varying lengths of
time. Though not without its benefits, anonymous juries raise
questions regarding a defendant’s presumption of innocence,
the public’s right to an open trial, judicial discretion, and the
States, 270 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that jurors’ addresses may be
withheld).
9
See infra subpart I.B.
10
See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 8, 457–58.
11
See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 1979); see
also Arnold H. Lubasch, Jurors in Gotti Case to Be Sequestered and Not Identified,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/15/nyregion/jurors-in-gotti-case-to-be-sequestered-and-not-identified.html [https://perma.cc/
3HQ2-5VVA] (reporting that jurors will be innominate in the trial of infamous mob
boss John Gotti).
12
E.g., Neil Harvey, Jurors in Neo-Nazi Trial Will Remain Anonymous, ROANOKE
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.roanoke.com/news/crime/roanoke/jurorsin-neo-nazi-trial-will-remain-anonymous/article_b643236c-8672-5c61-aab099d7ad723516.html [https://perma.cc/8S6S-PZWV].
13
See, e.g., Diane Dimond, Casey Anthony Jurors Fear Threats After Identities Revealed Oct. 25, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 23, 2011, 10:59 PM), https://www.the
dailybeast.com/casey-anthony-jurors-fear-threats-after-identities-revealed-oct25 [https://perma.cc/KB3R-KJHW] (reporting juror fear regarding their names
being released after the trial of Casey Anthony).
14
E.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA Trial Opens with References to Cash Drops and
Bag Men, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/
sports/soccer/fifa-trial-marin-napout-burga.html [https://perma.cc/9QF43ZNV].
15
E.g., Carrie Johnson, Why Courts Use Anonymous Juries, Like in Freddie
Gray Case, NPR (Nov. 30, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/11/30/457905697/why-courts-use-anonymous-juries-like-in-freddie-gray-case [https://perma.cc/J5P7-XC99] (noting that the judge in the Freddie Gray police brutality case empaneled a completely anonymous jury).
16
See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2010);
see also B.J. Lutz, Blagojevich Jurors to Remain Anonymous, NBC CHI. (Feb. 8,
2011, 8:51 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/BlagovevichJurors-to-Remain-Anonymous-115612614.html [https://perma.cc/Z3UK-6MN6]
(reporting that jurors’ names in former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s retrial
will remain anonymous throughout the trial).
17
Dean Seal, Called ‘Drastic,’ Anonymous Juries Nevertheless Rising in Use,
DAILY PROGRESS (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/
called-drastic-anonymous-juries-nevertheless-rising-in-use/article_be05c22a6b8e-5d93-a9aa-455d1241aa11.html [https://perma.cc/QAM6-Q3KJ].
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impacts of anonymity on juror decision-making. In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, courts have fashioned various approaches to the issue.18 The anonymous jury is
unquestionably a potent tool that affords a court great flexibility to meet the exigencies of a trial head on. But its extraordinary characteristics counsel care in its empanelment.
This Note begins in Part I by providing an overview of the
jury, focusing particularly on the definitional issue regarding
the myriad configurations an “anonymous jury” takes. Next,
Part II provides a survey of various standards federal and state
courts use in empaneling anonymous juries. Then, Part III
analyzes the many implications that arise when an anonymous
jury is used and concludes that the definitional ambiguity,
broad discretion, and insufficient juror accountability under
the majority test employed across courts are detrimental to the
jury’s underlying principles and warrant a different approach.
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution—adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach to anonymous juries and requiring reasoned
verdicts when an anonymous jury is empaneled—and provides
an illustration of the proposed test to a modern example: highprofile cases of law enforcement violence.
I
THE JURY AND ANONYMITY
A. A Brief Background on the Jury
Among our societal institutions, the jury occupies a unique
place at the confluence of the state, civil society, and political
society.19 In Williams v. Florida, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the “essential feature” of a jury is twofold: its
interposing of “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”
between litigants and the resulting “community participation
and shared responsibility” jurors experience after completing
their service.20 Indeed, both the original states and each state
that subsequently joined the Union guarantee some form of
18

See infra Part II.
See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 15–17 (2010). Indeed, jury
service is a duty for all citizens. See Scott Simon, Even (Former) Presidents Have
to Go to Jury Duty, NPR (Nov. 11, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/
11/11/563409708/even-former-presidents-have-to-go-to-jury-duty [https://per
ma.cc/KKV3-WXU3] (noting that even former presidents, including former President Obama, have been called for jury duty).
20
See 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
19

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN602.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 5

A JURY OF YOUR [REDACTED]

8-NOV-18

12:51

1625

jury trial.21 Before the jury may serve, however, it must first be
selected.
Voir dire is the investigative jury selection process employed across courts nationwide, used to empanel an ideal,
representative jury—a jury composed of a fair, random cross
section of the community.22 During the process, judges and
attorneys question prospective jurors, called venirepersons,23
to determine whether that person is legally qualified to serve
and can remain impartial and unbiased toward the parties.24
Notably, the judge enjoys broad discretion in conducting voir
dire.25 And this discretion extends to anonymity. Generally,
voir dire marks the beginning of an anonymous jury.26 Indeed,
various courts have termed a jury anonymous, withholding
some combination of juror names, addresses, work information, or even ethnic backgrounds, from the beginning of voir
dire.27 This raises a threshold question: What does the term
“anonymous jury” mean? Courts have appended the “anonymous jury” label to various configurations of anonymity.
B. The Amorphous Definition of Anonymity
It is perhaps unsurprising that the spectrum of anonymity
among the various anonymous juries empaneled is as broad as
the discretion the judge possesses to empanel them. A clear
understanding of the several types of anonymity found within
the “anonymous jury” label, therefore, is necessary in order to
properly evaluate the implications of anonymous juries on the
21

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at 74.
23
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618–19 (1991).
24
BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 38. An in-depth treatment of voir
dire is outside the scope of this Note. See generally CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES (William A. Masterson ed., 1986), for a detailed discussion of
the various stages of the trial process, including voir dire.
25
See FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (“The court may permit the parties or their attorneys
to examine prospective jurors or may itself do so.” (emphasis added)); Aldridge v.
United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931); cf. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583, 586 (1919) (“There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which
requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal
cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.”).
26
Though beyond the scope of this Note, there are other techniques, such as
jury sequestration or gag orders, through which juror information might effectively be anonymized. See generally Jaime N. Morris, The Anonymous Accused:
Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901,
904–14 (2003) (discussing jury sequestration and gag orders in highly publicized
criminal cases).
27
E.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 133–37 (2d Cir. 1979) (assigning jurors numbers for identification purposes and withholding their identities, residences, and ethnic backgrounds).
22
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court, the public, and the parties. In contradistinction to the
“usual case”28 of a routinely selected jury, a jury is anonymous
when certain information that would otherwise be available to
the parties and court is withheld.29 Juror anonymity may thus
be conceptualized on four axes: the quantity of information
anonymized, the amount of parties barred from the
anonymized information, the duration of anonymity, and the
nature of the anonymized information divulged post-trial.
Myriad juror information may be anonymized, such as the
jurors’ names, ages, addresses, levels of education, and types
of employment; the degree of anonymized information varies
depending on the exigencies of the case.30 Among the least
anonymizing forms of an anonymous jury is the “innominate
jury”: a jury in which the only piece of information withheld
from the parties are the names of the jurors.31 A more
anonymizing form of an anonymous jury is the aptly named
“numbers jury,” in which jurors are identified in court by a
number instead of their name.32 Even within the term “numbers jury,” however, disagreement exists as to the precise contours of that term.33 On the other end of the anonymity
spectrum, courts have anonymized much more information.
For example, in United States v. Ross, the court empaneled an
anonymous jury that withheld the jurors’ “names, addresses,
places of employment, and spouses’ names and places of employment.”34 Notably, the Ross court withheld this information
from the outset of the trial.35
Moreover, from whom—the parties, the public, the court,
or counsel—juror information is withheld likewise varies. The
common case involves the court withholding information from
the public.36 Withholding information from the public, of
28
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 n.22 (11th Cir. 1994) (“In the
usual case, the parties know the names, addresses, and occupations of potential
jurors, as well as those of any spouses . . . .”).
29
See State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 194 (Neb. 2010).
30
Id. at 195–96.
31
See United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002).
32
Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d at 194 (noting that although jurors were identified
in court by numbers, counsel, but not the defendant, knew the names of potential
jurors).
33
See Perez v. People, 302 P.3d 222, 225–26 (Colo. 2013) (referring to a jury
as a numbers jury when jurors were identified in court by numbers yet both
counsel and defendant knew the names of jurors).
34
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994).
35
Id. Moreover, the court ordered the jurors to meet in a location from which
federal marshals would escort them to and from the courthouse; this was done
out of concerns for security and presumably anonymity. Id.
36
See, e.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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course, intuitively raises questions regarding whether constitutional issues are implicated; these issues are discussed in Part
III below. Courts have also withheld juror information from the
defendant and the public; in Ross, for example, the court withheld the juror information previously mentioned from both the
defendant and the public, reasoning that the defendant had
“previously attempted to interfere with the judicial process”
and that “harmful pretrial publicity had occurred.”37 In another case, a court disclosed juror information to the defendant’s counsel, but ordered that they not disclose the
information to anyone, including the defendant.38
Furthermore, the timing when it comes to releasing previously withheld information and the extent of the information
divulged varies. For example, in United States v. Brown, the
court empaneled an anonymous jury and took a particularly
stringent approach toward timing and information divulged
when it denied a news media request for juror information
post-verdict.39 Courts have, on the other hand, imposed durational limits on anonymity; in United States v. Doherty, for
example, the court allowed juror information to be withheld
from the public for only seven days post-verdict.40 Moreover,
even if courts choose to lift the veil of anonymity, they might
nevertheless not divulge all previously anonymized information. Courts might, for example, completely withhold all information, as in Brown,41 but they might also release anonymized
information in a generalized way so as to preserve a heightened
degree of anonymity that detailed information would not have.
Consider, for example, United States v. Melendez, where the
court did not divulge the jurors’ first names, specific addresses,
and places of employment, but did divulge their surnames,
counties and general areas of residence, and types of
employment.42
In sum, courts have approached the label of anonymous
juries in myriad ways. Indeed, the broad discretion involved in
empaneling an anonymous jury—a matter of “trial administration”43—gives courts wide latitude in determining exactly what
37

See Ross, 33 F.3d at 1519.
State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 194 (Neb. 2010).
39
250 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2001).
40
675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (“Lifting the [anonymity] order
seven days after the return of the verdict thus accommodates all the relevant
interests. . . .”).
41
Brown, 250 F.3d at 918.
42
743 F. Supp. 134, 138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
43
See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
38
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form their anonymous juries will take. In fact, courts might
withhold a variety of juror information as early as voir dire.
Furthermore, courts might withhold the information from some
of the parties, from the public, or it might withhold the information solely from the defendant, while allowing counsel access. Moreover, courts might set deadlines for disclosure, and,
even upon disclosure, courts retain discretion with regards to
the type and specificity of information divulged. Thus, there
exists a wide spectrum bookended by the routine, non-anonymous jury on one end and the completely anonymous jury on
the other. There is not, however, a uniform framework for empaneling an anonymous jury. Indeed, various approaches exist
among federal and state courts regarding when an anonymous
jury might properly be empaneled.
II
ANONYMOUS JURIES AMONG THE COURTS
Though the anonymous jury is but a few decades removed
from its inception—a mere fry in the ocean of jury history—it
has proliferated far and wide among both federal and state
courts. Judicial power to empanel an anonymous jury is variously derived from local court rules, statutes, or common law.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has yet to squarely
address anonymous juries: it has provided neither the circumstances in which an anonymous jury may be empaneled nor
the analytical framework to determine whether an anonymous
jury has been properly empaneled.44 Accordingly, various
standards governing anonymous juries have arisen among federal and state courts. Before examining the anonymous jury in
the modern context, however, an overview of the seminal case
that produced this “judicial fluke”45 is instructive.
In United States v. Barnes, Judge Werker of the Southern
District of New York empaneled the first completely anonymous
jury in the trial of Leroy “Nicky” Barnes.46 Barnes, crime boss
of the then-largest heroin distribution network in Harlem,47
was tried along with fourteen co-defendants on a litany of
44
See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[The
United States Supreme Court] has [not] decided under what circumstances, and
after what procedures, jurors’ names may be kept confidential. . . .”).
45
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 8, at 458.
46
604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
47
Barnes himself has told his story across myriad media. See generally
LEROY BARNES & TOM FOLSOM, MR. UNTOUCHABLE (2007) (detailing Barnes’ criminal
enterprise; his subsequent arrest, trial, and conviction; and his later life as state’s
evidence); MR. UNTOUCHABLE (Magnolia Pictures 2007) (same).
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charges including conspiracy, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, violating narcotics laws, and firearm possession.48 Notably, there were no threats to potential jurors before
trial; government officials, however, received an anonymous
telephone call that threatened to murder one of the Government’s witnesses, who was being held in protective custody, if
the witness cooperated with the Government at trial.49 This
threat was not unfounded: before the trial began, another potential witness against Barnes was found dead.50 At trial, the
court rejected the prosecution’s motion to sequester the jury
and instead prohibited disclosure of the venirepersons’ names,
addresses, religions, and ethnic backgrounds.51 Moreover, the
trial judge neither solicited the views of either party nor did he
allow any challenges to the procedure during trial.52 Ultimately, Barnes and ten of his co-defendants were found
guilty.53 The defendants appealed, arguing that the anonymous jury violated their due process.54 The Second Circuit
was unpersuaded.55 It noted that neither statutory nor constitutional law compelled blanket disclosure of juror information.56 With regards to voir dire, the Second Circuit, after
examining precedent, stated that all that was required was
“some questioning as to identifiable issues connected in some
way with persons, places, or things likely to arise during the
trial.”57 After noting the perils of organized-crime investigations, threat of jury tampering, media harassment of jurors,
and the broad discretion a trial judge enjoys in conducting the
trial,58 the Second Circuit explained that anonymity “com48

Barnes, 604 F.2d at 130–31.
Id. at 136 (“[The Government] was called by an anonymous caller who
allegedly said, about [the witness]: ‘If he does anything, he’ll be dead.’”).
50
Id. at 137 n.7 (“Indeed, on the eve of trial, in September 1977, a potential
witness Shepard Franklin, was reportedly murdered at the Harlem River Motors
Garage—the site of much of the trafficking in this case.” (citation omitted)).
51
Id. at 135.
52
Id. at 169 (“[E]very time counsel for the defendants sought to challenge the
district court’s ruling, either orally or in writing, their requests were sharply
denied.”).
53
Id. at 133. Barnes’s conviction on the charge of continuing criminal enterprise resulted in a life sentence. Id. at 156.
54
Id. at 133.
55
Id. at 142–43.
56
See id. at 144. The Second Circuit acknowledged the existence of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3432, which requires disclosure of potential jurors’ names and addresses, but
noted its inapplicability to non-capital cases. Id. at 143 n.11.
57
Id. at 139.
58
Id. at 137 (“A general principle of law thus has been developed that the trial
judge has broad discretion in conducting the voir dire, . . . as he does in his
conduct of the trial generally.” (citations omitted)).
49
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ported with [the court’s] obligation to protect the jury, to assure
its privacy, and to avoid all possible mental blocks against
impartiality.”59 The Second Circuit thus upheld the empanelment of an anonymous jury and provided the principles that
underlie its use to this day.60
A. Federal Courts
Since their spontaneous beginnings in the Northeast,
anonymous juries have spread across the United States—every
federal circuit has empaneled an anonymous jury.61 Most circuits, although requiring some evidence that warrants anonymity, adhere to a similar test that empowers the trial judge
with broad discretion to empanel an anonymous jury.
Across the majority of circuits, an anonymous jury may be
empaneled if two conditions are met. The trial court must first
“conclud[e] that there is [a] strong reason to believe the jury
needs protection”; if that condition is met, then the court must
take “reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that [the defendant’s]
fundamental rights are protected.”62 If this two-pronged test is
met, then an anonymous jury may be properly empaneled.
Several factors have been articulated to guide trial judges when
determining whether the first prong has been satisfied. In empaneling anonymous juries, courts generally consider: (1) the
defendant’s involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendant’s
participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3)
the defendant’s past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defen59
Id. at 141. The Second Circuit, additionally, pointed to the fact that two
defendants were entirely acquitted as indicative that all the defendants were
accorded all process due. See id. at 143 n.12. But see Christopher Keleher, The
Repercussions of Anonymous Juries, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 531, 536–37 (2010)
(describing Barnes and another co-defendant’s semi-botched attempt to bribe an
acquaintance that had been selected as a juror in their case).
60
Barnes, 604 F.2d at 143. Not all Judges agreed with the result reached.
See id. at 170–74 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (noting with concern that anonymity
could not guarantee impartiality and undermined peremptory challenges). The
Supreme Court, however, denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Barnes v.
United States, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
61
See, e.g., United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Deitz, 577
F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States
v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988).
62
See Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192 (citations omitted).
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dant will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial
monetary penalties; and (5) whether extensive publicity exists
that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names would
become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment.63 With regards to the test’s second prong, courts have
given curative instructions to mitigate the prejudicial risk
anonymous empanelment poses; instead of focusing on juror
safety from the defendant as justification for anonymity, these
instructions typically attribute anonymity toward the need to
protect the jury from harassment from the media.64 The decision whether to empanel an anonymous jury is “entitled to
deference and is subject to abuse of discretion review.”65 Some
63
Krout, 66 F.3d at 1427; see also United States v. Mostafa, 7 F. Supp. 3d
334, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]hree factors that a district court should examine
[to determine whether to empanel an anonymous jury are]: (1) whether the
charges against the defendant are serious, (2) whether there is a substantial
potential threat of corruption to the judicial process, and (3) whether considerable
media coverage of the trial is anticipated.”).
64
Shryock, 342 F.3d at 972–73. United States v. Thomas exemplifies a typical instruction:
Now, this should be a very interesting case. Undoubtedly, it could
receive considerable publicity, newspaper, radio and television. The
media and the public may be curious concerning the identity of the
participants, the witnesses, the lawyers and the jurors. That curiosity and its resultant comments might come to the attention of the
jury selected here and possibly impair its impartiality by viewpoints
expressed, comments made, opinions, inquiries and so forth.

Now, such outside influences could tend to distort what goes on in
court, the evidence, and be distracting and divert the attention of
the jury, and it might result in people prying into personal affairs of
the participants, including those selected as jurors, who are selected only to judge the evidence in the case that can legally come
before you, and thus to distort and distract attention from the case.
Consequently, taking into consideration all the circumstances, I
have decided that in selecting those who will serve as the jury your
name, your address and your place of employment will remain
anonymous during the trial of this case, and that’s the reason why
you have been given numbers.
This will serve to ward off curiosity and seekers for information that
might otherwise infringe on your privacy and it will aid in insulating
and sheltering you from unwanted and undesirable publicity and
embarrassment and notoriety and any access to you which would
interfere with preserving your sworn duty to fairly, impartially and
independently serve as jurors. It will permit the media complete
freedom of coverage of this trial.
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.1 (2d Cir. 1985).
65
Krout, 66 F.3d at 1426. Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court inquires whether the decision reached by the lower court was “grossly
unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.” Abuse of Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 74
F.3d 562, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the trial court abused its
discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury when there was no extensive media
publicity and defendant, a police officer, was not involved in organized crime, did
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circuits, however, have applied a plain error standard of review
when no objection to the empanelment of an anonymous jury is
made on the record.66 Although “something more” than a terrorism or organized-crime label is required to justify anonymity, this does not appear to be a particularly demanding finding
to make.67 Logistically, one way in which courts preserve juror
anonymity is by employing marshals who transport jurors from
an undisclosed location to the courthouse.68
The heavily followed and publicized trial of former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards and several others illustrates the
application of the majority rule in the modern context: anonymous juries—no longer confined to organized-crime trials—
empaneled amid concerns about juror privacy and harassment.69 Edwards, an infamous politician,70 and his co-defendants, some of whom were other government officials, were
indicted on charges that included “numerous counts of connot attempt to harm jurors, and had not attempted to interfere with the judicial
process); see also KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD 45–46 (2013)
(discussing that the abuse of discretion standard is ambiguous in theory but
concrete in application).
66
See, e.g., United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). A
plain error is a substantial error that if left uncorrected violates due process and
damages the integrity of the judicial process. Plain Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); CLERMONT, supra note 65, at
45–46, 48 (“The power to reverse for plain error is an exception to the adversary
principle of party-presentation . . . .”).
67
See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 809 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (finding that defendants’ alleged association with an organized crime family
that had a history of interference with the judicial process justified empanelment
of an anonymous jury); see also United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir.
1991) (“This ‘something more’ can be a demonstrable history or likelihood of
obstruction of justice on the part of the defendant . . . or a showing that trial
evidence will depict a pattern of violence by the defendant[ ] . . . such as would
cause a juror to reasonably fear for his own safety.”).
68
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994).
Another way to preserve juror anonymity is by use of the aforementioned “numbers jury”: the court assigns each juror a number and only refers to the juror by
that number during the trial.
69
United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 918–19 (5th Cir. 2001).
70
Since beginning his political career in 1954, Edwin Edwards has been a
colorful and controversial state senator, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a four-term governor of Louisiana; ultimately, he served eight
years in prison after being found guilty of racketeering charges. See Bill Nichols,
Edwin Edwards’ Last Stand, POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2014 5:05 AM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2014/04/edwin-edwards-louisiana-2014-elections-105563
[https://perma.cc/AZH5-FXYD] (reporting 86-year-old Edwards’s post-prison
campaign for Congress); see also Sean Sullivan, The Greatest Quotes of Edwin
Edwards, WASH. POST. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2014/02/20/edwin-edwardss-greatest-hits-crooks-super-pacs-andviagra/ [https://perma.cc/EH2X-6DD7] (“I will be a model prisoner as I was a
model citizen.”).

R
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spiracy, mail and wire fraud, insurance fraud, making false
statements, and witness tampering.”71 The United States
moved for an anonymous jury, and the defendants opposed the
motion.72 The district court discussed three factors that justified empanelment of an anonymous jury: the defendants attempted to interfere with the judicial process through witness
tampering, attempted to bribe a judge, and attempted to illegally terminate a federal investigation; the defendants faced
potentially lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary
penalties; and this case and other related trials received extensive publicity.73 Remarkably, there were neither elements of
organized crime nor physical danger toward the potential jurors;74 the district court nevertheless granted the motion and
empaneled an anonymous jury.75 Indeed, the district court
was particularly concerned with juror privacy and harassment
concerns when noting that in a previous, related trial, the media “aggressively followed, identified, and contacted jurors in
violation of the anonymous jury order” and that the media’s
conduct “strongly counsels the Court to protect the panel from
foreseeable harassment by the media and others.”76 Although
the anonymous jury was not challenged on appeal, the Fifth
Circuit noted that, due in part to “[v]ery real threats . . . posed
by excessive media coverage,” the trial judge’s decision to empanel an anonymous jury was appropriate.77
B. State Courts
In keeping with their role as laboratories of democracy,78
states generally exhibit a more diverse approach to anonymous
juries. At present, a considerable number of states permit the
possibility of anonymous juries through either a statutory or
71

Brown, 250 F.3d at 910.
Id.
73
Id. at 910–11.
74
Whether a group of government officials abusing their positions for illgotten gains constitutes organized crime is a question beyond the scope of this
Note.
75
Brown, 250 F.3d at 910 (withholding jurors’ names, addresses, and places
of employment).
76
Id. at 911.
77
See id. at 922.
78
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
72
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common law grant of power to the trial judge, as illustrated in
Figure 1.79
FIGURE 1
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79
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-136
(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4513 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 612-18 to -27
(2017); IDAHO CODE § 2-220 (2017); IND. CODE § 33-28-5-12 (2017); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 1254-B (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-202 (West
2017); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-32 (2017); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09 (2017); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18 (2017); State v. Rodriguez,
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0659, 2017 WL 443528 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017); Perez v.
People, 302 P.3d 222 (Colo. 2013); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1989);
State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1996); People v. Collins, 813 N.E.2d 285 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004); Green v. State, 994 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); State v.
Robinson, 363 P.3d 875 (Kan. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 164 (2016); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1993); People v. Williams, 616
N.W.2d 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Golnick v. Callender, 860 N.W.2d 180 (Neb.
2015); State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio 2001); State v. Washington, 330 P.3d
596 (Or. 2014) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892 (Pa. 2007); State
v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 914 (2006); State v.
Ross, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007); State v. Thompson, No. 23805-5-II, 2001 Wash.
App. LEXIS 49 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2001); State v. Tucker, 657 N.W.2d 374
(Wis. 2003). In past years, legislators in Connecticut and New Jersey have introduced bills regarding anonymous juries, but they were not enacted. See H.B.
5841, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (proposing complete anonymity to prospective jurors in criminal cases); Assemb. B. 1776, 213th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2008) (proposing procedure for empaneling anonymous juries). Interestingly, although Louisiana courts have not empaneled anonymous juries, they
have expressly used factors from the majority federal test when determining
whether to disclose the identity of a witness to a defendant. See State v. Le, 188
So. 3d 1072, 1080 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
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Some states, like Tennessee and Utah, have simply
adopted the majority federal test.80 Other states, like Minnesota, expressly provide a framework for empaneling anonymous juries in their rules of criminal procedure.81 In a similar
vein, California provides a statutory path toward revealing juror information post-verdict: any person, upon a showing of
good cause, may access withheld juror information unless
there is a “compelling interest against disclosure.”82 Indeed,
the principles underlying the use of anonymous juries in state
courts are consonant with the principles in federal courts.
State courts, generally, look toward whether protecting the jurors from danger, intimidation, or harassment justifies the risk
of infringing the defendant’s presumption of innocence.83
New York, however, counts itself among the states that
currently bar the use of anonymous juries.84 Its state courts
have construed their jury selection statute, CPL 270.15, to generally allow judges to only withhold juror addresses; they are,
on the other hand, prohibited from withholding juror names.85
Indeed, a recent case, People v. Flores, appeared to be the paradigmatic case for empaneling an anonymous jury. There, the
trial judge sua sponte empaneled an anonymous jury in a criminal case involving four defendants reputed to be violent gang
members.86 The appellate court, on appeal, held that the
anonymous jury violated the defendants’ right to a fair trial.87
More notable than the majority’s decision, however, was Judge
Dillon’s dissent. He began by first noting that an anonymous
jury had already been empaneled in a New York court before
the passage of CPL 270.15.88 Moreover, legislative intent indicated that CPL 270.15 was meant to safeguard prospective
jurors in criminal cases who faced credible threats of “harm,
intimidation, or bribery” and to let them serve as jurors without
80

See Ivy, 188 S.W.3d at 144; Ross, 174 P.3d at 636–38.
See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 (allowing anonymous jury empanelment but
requiring, among other things, detailed findings of fact supporting the
empanelment).
82
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237(b) (explaining that a compelling interest against
disclosure includes, among other things, protecting jurors from threats or danger
of physical harm).
83
See Robinson, 363 P.3d at 1006–07. State courts, like federal courts, allow
the use of curative jury instructions as a means with which to minimize prejudice
against the defendant. E.g., id. at 1004.
84
See People v. Flores, 153 A.D.3d 182, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
85
See id. at 188.
86
See id. at 184–85.
87
See id. at 188.
88
Id. at 206 (Dillon, J.P., dissenting).
81
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fear of repercussions.89 But that salutary purpose, as Judge
Dillon aptly notes, is frustrated by that very statute in the age
of ubiquitous, Internet-connected devices and the prevalence of
social media. A juror’s address may yield a juror’s “family relationships, employment details, and general background information[, all] immediately obtained at the courthouse.”90 In
other words, statutory construction underpinned by an understanding of 20th century technology is outdated when a wealth
of juror information is one click away. Although his fellow
judges were unpersuaded, Judge Dillon’s dissent may prove
convincing elsewhere—the court, after reversing the trial court
and ordering a new trial, sua sponte granted the prosecution
leave to appeal its decision to the New York Court of Appeals.91
If appealed, it will be the first time New York’s highest court
considers the issue of anonymous juries.92
Anonymous juries are empaneled among state and federal
courts. Though the federal and state courts that allow anonymous juries exhibit some variations among the tests used to
empanel one, they are generally characterized by a broad grant
of discretion to the trial judge. This, of course, allows the trial
court to tailor procedures to meet the circumstances of the
case before them. Yet concerns remain regarding the use of
anonymous juries. Indeed, their use implicates interests beyond the courtroom.
III
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
Anonymous juries, by their very name, instantly evoke
consideration for one actor within the judicial system—the
jury. And understandably so. Concerns over juror safety, harassment, and undue influence provided the impetus for their
89

Id. at 201.
See id. at 207.
91
Id. at 215 (granting permission to appeal pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602).
The Second Department’s unusual procedural move perhaps underscores the
significance of this case. In contrast with the more well-known writ of certiorari
process in the federal system, parties can ask New York appellate courts for a
grant to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals; but an appellate court’s sua
sponte grant to appeal, although possible, is seldom seen and should be done
“sparingly.” See Rob Rosborough, Second Department Grants Leave to Appeal to
Court of Appeals Sua Sponte. Can It Do That?, N.Y. APPEALS (July 6, 2017), https://
nysappeals.com/2017/07/06/second-department-grants-leave-to-appeal-tocourt-of-appeals-sua-sponte-can-it-do-that/ [https://perma.cc/5YUK-CZFJ]
(analyzing the issue and noting that the N.Y. C.P.L.R., which the Flores court cited
in its grant to appeal, is normally inapplicable in a criminal case like Flores).
92
See Flores, 153 A.D.3d at 208.
90
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creation.93 But juries serve a broader purpose: they infuse a
trial with community values, they signal legitimacy toward society, and their judgments prompt civic and political debate.94
Indeed, juries implicate interests of the parties, the public, the
court, and the jurors themselves.95 Understanding these implications is necessary to understanding the anonymous jury’s
place within the American legal system.
A. The Parties
Anonymous juries, at their most immediate, affect the parties to the trial in which an anonymous jury is empaneled, and
perhaps no consideration is more crucial than the defendant’s
presumption of innocence stemming from the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.96 But anonymity may introduce deleterious effects. Jurors, as some scholars note, may arrive to
court emotionally predisposed against jury duty—they might
be angry, upset, or uncertain97—and those emotions affect
their decision-making.98 Anonymity, in this heightened emotional state, fuels further uncertainty; after all, anonymity does
not comport with common views of juries.99 These feelings are
further fueled by the trial itself; a juror might wonder, in a
93

See supra notes 46–59 and accompanying text.
See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 9–10.
95
See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 12–17.
96
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895))). Indeed, the presumption of innocence is an ancient, bedrock principle worldwide. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 11(d), Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11
(U.K.) (“[Persons are] presumed innocent until proven guilty . . . .”); CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 29 (“[Every person is presumed innocent until they
have been declared judicially culpable.]”); Art. 27 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“[The
accused is not considered guilty until final conviction.]”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 49 (Russ.) (“[Any person accused of
committing a crime shall be considered innocent until his (her) guilt is
proven . . . .]”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
11 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[Everyone] has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty . . . .”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 48, Dec.
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C. 364) 1, 20 (“[Everyone] shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty . . . .”); DIG. 22.3.2 (Paul, Edict 69) (“Proof lies on him who asserts,
not on him who denies.” (Roman law)).
97
See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 24–26 (discussing, among other
studies, one survey finding that 25% of venirepersons found jury duty inconvenient and another finding that disruptions to daily routines were among the top
sources of stress for jurors).
98
See id. at 242–46 (discussing how several types of emotions, including
emotions that do not arise out of the trial itself, affect jurors’ perceptions).
99
See id. at 18–23.
94

R
R
R
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numbers jury for example, what the defendant did to merit
such a procedure. Indeed, anonymity “rais[es] the specter that
the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the jurors
must be protected.”100 Thus, although the Supreme Court has
yet to directly address anonymous juries, courts should be
exceedingly mindful about the risk toward the defendant’s presumption of innocence.
Furthermore, an anonymous jury—especially its more
anonymizing forms—affects the parties’ trial strategy in myriad
ways. Lawyers attempt to build rapport and a narrative of their
case from voir dire onwards.101 Additionally, they consider jurors’ predilections and beliefs when it comes to presenting evidence and witnesses102—a particularly crucial consideration
given that evidence is virtually a determinative factor for juror
deliberation and decision-making.103 To be sure, a judge may
conduct voir dire and provide the parties with non-identifying
juror information that compensates for their paucity of knowledge. But a judge, rightly concerned with chiefly assuring the
impartiality of the jury, will likely provide less and less relevant
information to the parties, who are concerned with ferreting
out advantageous partiality during voir dire. Consider, moreover, recent technological developments like sentiment analysis:
algorithms that analyze vast amounts of text and data to determine the opinions, sentiments, and emotions expressed
therein.104 This technology is already incorporated in software
services that allow counsel to thoroughly search jurors’ online
presence, revealing their social media profiles, work experi100
See United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1048 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v.
Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994)).
101
See generally MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS,
AND STRATEGY (2008) (describing voir dire as the first opportunity to make a
favorable impression upon potential jurors and emphasizing the crucial need for a
sound voir dire strategy).
102
See id. at 51–52 (discussing the need for evidence that comports with the
jury’s common sense).
103
See Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases:
Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 300–01 (1998)
(finding in one study that evidence is the most common deliberation topic, accounting for 36% of deliberation time); Ann Burnett Pettus, “The Verdict Is In: A
Study of Jury Decision Making Factors, Moment of Personal Decision, and Jury
Deliberations—From the Jurors’ Point of View,” 38 COMM. Q. 83, 88 (1990) (finding
in one study that evidence and witnesses are the two most frequently cited influences on juror verdicts).
104
See Bing Liu, Sentiment Analysis and Subjectivity, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL
LANGUAGE PROCESSING 627, 629 (Nitin Indurkhya & Fred J. Damerau eds., 2d ed.
2010).
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ence, interests, and even personalities.105 Indeed, those services could be used to discover juror biases or prejudices that
rise to a level of a strike for cause; but against an anonymous
jury, these tools are effectively neutralized. Additionally, peremptory challenges are also hampered when an anonymous
jury is empaneled: parties, lacking identifying juror information, must rely on information from a voir dire conducted solely
by the judge. In sum, anonymity casts a shadow both on the
defendant’s presumption of innocence and on practical trial
considerations, and that may have public repercussions.
B. The Public
The First Amendment, in addition to granting the freedoms
of religion and speech, grants the public a constitutional right
to access criminal trials, a right applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.106 This right, as the Supreme
Court has explained, serves to legitimize the criminal justice
system; it guarantees both the “basic fairness” and the “appearance of fairness” of the criminal trial.107 An anonymous
jury necessarily casts a shroud over a trial and consequently
implicates these constitutional considerations. An anonymous
jury hinders the media from fully reporting on a criminal trial,
which in turn hinders society’s ability to collectively deliberate
over the jury’s judgments and a court’s decisions. In fact, thorough reporting has functioned as a check on judicial proceedings, uncovering impropriety and biases that otherwise would
have remained hidden.108
Furthermore, one study found that more than half of jurors
surveyed felt better toward the justice system after serving,109
another found that venirepersons who understood why they
were dismissed accorded greater legitimacy toward voir dire,110
and yet another found that a consequential jury experience
105
See, e.g., VIJILENT, https://www.vijilent.com/ [https://perma.cc/5UPJ2PC9] (last visited Nov. 9, 2017) (offering comprehensive profiles of individuals
created by “powerful” tools that gather “thousands of data points” from
“thousands of sources”).
106
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573–80 (1980) (noting a long history of presumptive openness in criminal trials).
107
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
108
See William R. Montross, Jr. & Patrick Mulvaney, Virtue and Vice: Who Will
Report on the Failings of the American Criminal Justice System?, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1429, 1438–42 (2009).
109
See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 27.
110
See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views Regarding the Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1061, 1094–98 (2003).
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enhances civic engagement.111 An anonymous jury may impact these salutary effects. Serving on an anonymous jury
necessarily involves a more cloistered experience, one that does
not offer the juror the full spectrum of jury service. In fact,
Gastil and others have found that jurors’ cognitive engagement
during the trial was a key aspect toward their resultant confidence in the jury system, pride in their civic service, and faith
in civic institutions.112 But, as explained below, anonymous
juries may involve psychological effects that result in decreased
cognitive engagement.113 In this way, anonymity might result
in detrimental effects on civic engagement. Additionally, potential jurors dismissed after a restrictive voir dire might not be
given a full or satisfactory reason for their dismissal because of
potential privacy concerns. Indeed, an anonymous juror—
under the specter of danger that anonymity may bring—might
lose out on the sense of agency and responsibility-taking that
result in a meaningful jury experience.114 In sum, anonymous
juries partly shroud a criminal trial and may blunt the beneficial effects of civic engagement, thus affecting the legitimacy of
the verdict, an interest “essential to respect for the rule of
law.”115
C. The Court
Questions of consistency across adjudications, uniformity
across outcomes, and quality across judgments arise in jurisdictions that commit empaneling anonymous juries to a trial
court’s discretion. Judicial discretion, essentially, constitutes
the broad latitude by the decision-maker to determine a “correct” outcome—without being constrained by bright-line rules
of decision—based upon a set of conditions present or absent
in the instant case, and it is pervasive across our legal system.116 Discretion is beneficial because it allows judges—those
111

See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 30.
See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 174–76.
113
See infra notes 125–133 and accompanying text.
114
See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 29.
115
See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
116
See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1561, 1562–70 (2003); see also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S.
738, 866 (1824) (“When [courts] are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630–32 (1994) (contending that judges prefer
greater discretion). There are, however, legislative efforts in at least one state to
curtail the discretion trial judges enjoy. See Press Release, Ash Kalra, Bill to
Foster Fair Juries Authored by Assemblymember Ash Kalra Signed Into Law by
Governor (Sept. 27, 2017), https://a27.asmdc.org/press-release/bill-foster-fair112
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closest to the facts and conditions of the case—to respond to
unforeseen complications and to best effectuate the spirit of
the law itself.117 But there are, however, issues that militate
against broad discretion: among others, the psychological concepts of bounded rationality and information access. Bounded
rationality describes the issue of systemic biases being introduced into a decision when decision-makers, faced with complex decisions, use heuristics to guide decision-making.118
Moreover, information access describes the problem a judge
faces when he or she act on an incomplete factual record; when
a judge, for example, makes a decision before all the facts have
been introduced and subjected to adversarial proceedings at
trial.119 These problems are particularly acute in the anonymous jury context, especially because a judge might be tasked
with empaneling an anonymous jury as early as voir dire. To
be sure, there may be dispositive facts; for example, a previous
criminal verdict and overwhelming evidence of continued gang
affiliation. But when the judge must balance the risk toward
the jury against the infringement of the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the judge has limited facts, there is opportunity for systemic bias to occur if the judge looks toward
some of the factors commonly used like, for example, whether
defendants are involved in organized crime, their participation
in a group with capacity to harm jurors, or the potential that
they will suffer lengthy incarceration or monetary penalties.120
In these cases, a judge drifts perilously close to prejudging the
merits of the case.121 For example, whether a defendant is
involved in organized crime is a conclusory fact that ought to be
determined by the factfinder, not the presiding judge, at the
juries-authored-assemblymember-ash-kalra-signed-law-governor [https://per
ma.cc/3JQ8-3J57] (announcing passage of California legislation that requires
courts to allow “liberal and probing” questioning of venirepersons by counsel).
Judicial efforts are, remarkably, likewise underway. See Maura Ewing, A Judicial
Pact to Cut Court Costs for the Poor, ATLANTIC (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/court-fines-north-carolina/548960/
[https://perma.cc/PJK9-UTS8] (reporting a commitment by trial judges in North
Carolina to consult a “bench card” that reminds them to fully assess a defendant’s
ability to pay before setting a fine or fee).
117
See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1965–70 (2007).
118
See CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 61–71; Bone, supra note 117, at 1987–91.
119
See Bone, supra note 117, at 1991–97; Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules,
Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 241–42 (1998).
120
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
121
See generally CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 12 (providing examples among
various legal tests that require judges to evaluate the probability of a future event
occurring).
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end of an adversarial proceeding and after each party has been
given all the process that they are due. Moreover, the factor
that looks toward sentence length or penalty is nonsensical
because federal crimes routinely result in potentially lengthy
incarcerations;122 thus, a defendant accused of a federal crime
might face an anonymous jury as a matter of course. Broad
discretion thus has the potential to introduce systemic biases
into a trial judge’s decision-making because they are faced with
obstacles—more so earlier in the trial—that open the door to
undue influence placed on incomplete information or biasprone test factors. Resultantly, this discretion introduces inconsistency across adjudications because of the minimal constraints placed upon judges when they decide whether to
empanel an anonymous jury; that inconsistency, in turn, affects the quality of judgments because similar cases run a
greater risk of not being treated alike.123
D. The Jury
To be sure, anonymity provides benefits that ultimately
redound toward increased juror safety. Jurors often express
concerns over whether their personal information will be available to the defendant or the public,124 and an anonymous jury
provides a remedy to these understandable fears. Furthermore, anonymity, in a general sense, aids in reducing certain
stressors associated with jury service; for example, anonymous
jurors are not exposed to publicity nor are they faced with
potentially probing intrusions into their personal life.
The potentially concerning effects of anonymity, however,
ought to make courts strongly consider other alternatives
before empaneling an anonymous jury. One notable mock jury
experiment studying the impacts of anonymity on juror decision-making reported that anonymous jurors returned approximately 15% more guilty verdicts than their non-anonymous
counterparts.125 In fact, that same study gave different sets of
anonymous jurors different curative instructions: one instruc122
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS 34 (2016) (noting that the average sentence imposed for
some defendants found guilty of federal crimes is 145 months); see also THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., PRISON TIME SURGES FOR FEDERAL INMATES 1–3 (2015) (illustrating
that the average prison time served by federal inmates more than doubled from
1988 to 2012).
123
See Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy, and
Error in Adjudication, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 40, 44–45 (2014).
124
See United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1155–56 (4th Cir. 1986).
125
See D. Lynn Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity
on Jury Verdicts, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 704 (1998).
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tion stated that anonymity was meant to protect jurors from
outside harassment and the other stated that anonymity was
meant to protect the jurors’ safety.126 That study found that
neither instruction significantly affected the verdicts anonymous juries rendered127—in other words, the curative instruction did not have the curative effect that courts assumed it
would have. This is, of course, worrying; it calls into question
the efficacy that curative instructions have when it comes to
ameliorating the effects of anonymity.
Moreover, anonymity necessarily results in deindividuation—the loss of self-awareness in groups128—which may result in undifferentiated decision-making performance within a
group, thus resulting in social loafing, groupthink, and, ultimately, impaired juror accountability. Undifferentiated performance occurs when individuals within a group no longer feel
a sense of distinct identities and roles;129 an acute concern
when individuals are anonymously empaneled. This results in
some concerning repercussions: social loafing—the tendency
for people to reduce effort in a group—and groupthink—the
tendency for groups to uncritically converge upon the same
conclusions by using the same assumptions and decisionmaking processes—both are heightened in undifferentiated
groups.130 A jury is already quite susceptible to group decision-making biases and pressures,131 and anonymity may not
only exacerbate those issues but also introduce new complications. Given that cases in which anonymous juries are used
are often criminal cases involving the loss of liberty, a juror
might already feel disinclined to voice an opinion in this
fraught context, and would be even more susceptible to being
swayed by the majority group’s decision-making process. In
this way, a sole anonymous juror might feel less accountable
for the ultimate verdict not only because they are anonymous
but because the anonymity has detrimentally impacted their
decision-making process. And the lack of accountability—that
126

See id. at 701–02.
See id. at 703.
128
See Philip G. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil:
Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 21, 29–30 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).
129
See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Are Groups More or Less Than the Sum of
Their Members? The Moderating Role of Individual Identification, 39 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCIS. e137, at 1–3 (2016).
130
See id. at 5–7.
131
See, e.g., BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 40–47 (discussing the role
explicit and implicit biases play in juror decision making).
127
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is, the lack of an expectation to define one’s beliefs132—further
impairs decision-making because accountability “emphasizes
the responsibility of individuals to behave autonomously and
present a valid basis for their actions.”133 These are acute
concerns in anonymous juries, and additional measures ought
to be taken to ameliorate these detrimental effects.
IV
A PROPOSED SOLUTION AND AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
A. Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s Approach and
Employing Reasoned Verdicts
In their present iteration, anonymous juries are empaneled
in cases seemingly removed from the chief issue first identified
in Barnes: juror safety. Now, anonymous juries are empaneled
in cases where the chief concern revolves around juror influence from the public or media. Moreover, the seemingly endless variations of an anonymous jury mean that the same test
can result in little anonymized information or, at the other
extreme, complete anonymity.134 Additionally, the concerns
regarding accountability and deindividuation are at their
zenith when jurors know that their information is anonymized.
In effect, they cease to become the representation of their community because there ceases to be any opportunity for accountability; the community, if it disagrees with the result
reached, cannot have a thorough, meaningful debate over the
decision because the verdict stands alone as the only piece of
information. The incidental trappings of a verdict—conversations about the jurors’ identities, their reactions, their questions on the record—are restricted with an anonymous jury.
Indeed, the anonymous jury in Barnes was unsuccessful in
preventing outside juror influence—Barnes and the co-defend132

See Baumeister et al., supra note 129, at 5–7.
Id. at 8.
134
This is not unlike the problem of “smooth” and “bumpy” laws, as one
scholar terms it: a smooth law is one in which a gradual change in legal input is
reflected by a gradual change in legal output; a bumpy law is one in which a
gradual change in legal input either dramatically affects legal output or does not
affect it at all. Applied to the majority test for anonymous juries, the range of legal
inputs bears no real relationship to the type of anonymity that results. In other
words, a judge may find one factor present and accordingly order a completely
anonymous jury; another judge may find all the factors present and simply order
an innominate jury. See generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (describing, among other things, how smooth laws create
consistency in adjudications and better preserve morally relevant information
than bumpy laws).
133
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ants successfully bribed one of the jurors.135 Anonymity, ironically, made it more difficult to detect this tampering. In
response to these concerns, this Note proposes an adoption of
the Seventh Circuit’s approach to juror anonymity and the use
of reasoned verdicts when anonymous juries are empaneled.
The majority test and its resultant various configurations
of anonymity mean that an anonymous jury is often used in
cases where the actual interests involved are not those that
underlie the paradigmatic anonymous jury, which mediates
the interests of the jurors and the defendant, but rather are
cases in which the chief interests are those of the jurors and
the public. This mismatch has been addressed in the Seventh
Circuit. There, before applying the majority test, the court begins with a threshold question: what kind of anonymity is involved—anonymity with regards to the defendant not knowing
juror information, or anonymity with regards to the public not
knowing juror information?136 The former is termed an anonymous jury; the latter is termed a confidential jury.137 If an
anonymous jury is requested or the court determines that an
anonymous jury might be required, then it applies the majority
federal test.138 If the court finds that a confidential jury is at
issue, then it applies an analysis that focuses on the public’s
common-law right of access to judicial records.139 The confidential jury test presumes that disclosure of judicial records is
favorable over nondisclosure.140 This presumption derives
135
After a co-defendant, Fisher, found out that an acquaintance had been
selected as a juror, Barnes and the other co-defendants paid $75,000 in exchange
for not guilty votes. But Fisher, unbeknownst to Barnes at the time, betrayed
Barnes and the other co-defendants by instructing that juror to vote not guilty
only for Fisher and not for the rest of the co-defendants. Keleher, supra note 59,
at 536–37.
136
See United States v. Harris, 763 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2014).
137
Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, has not definitively decided what constitutes an anonymous jury; it notes that, at least, “one necessary component that
must be withheld from the parties is the jurors’ names.” Id. at 885. Given the
concerns regarding juror accountability, potential infringements on the defendant’s presumption of innocence, and the vast amount of information that may be
found with just a juror’s name, this somewhat lax definition of anonymity is ideal
for the purposes of triggering anonymous jury analysis under the majority test.
138
Id.
139
See id. The Third Circuit has sometimes applied a First Amendment “experience and logic” test and held that the media has a First Amendment right of
access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors. See United States v.
Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 238 (3d Cir. 2008). But see Seth A. Fersko, Note, United
States v. Wecht: When Anonymous Juries, the Right of Access, and Judicial Discretion Collide, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 763, 768 (2010) (contending that the Third
Circuit improperly applied the “experience and logic” test to the issue in Wecht).
140
See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010).
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from the common-law tradition of open litigation,141 but it is
not absolute and may be overcome by an analysis turning on
whether the public’s access to judicial records was properly
denied;142 a court considers “the need for accountability of the
otherwise independent judiciary, the need of the public to have
confidence in the effective administration of justice, and the
need for civic debate and behavior to be informed.”143 This
approach clearly demarcates which interests are most implicated, provides structure to the types of anonymity at issue,
and correctly focuses on the underlying issues in each case—
the defendant’s due process rights in an anonymous jury analysis, and the public’s access to courts in a confidential jury
analysis.144 Additionally, a clear distinction between an anonymous and a confidential jury avoids the confusion that sometimes arises when a reviewing court must figure out what type
of anonymity was used in the lower court.145 Moreover, this
approach provides greater consistency in adjudications, as
parties will have a better idea of what kind of anonymity they
might face and can conform their behavior accordingly, which
minimizes potentially high error costs and increases judicial
efficiency.146
Finally, a form of reasoned verdicts—the requirement that
the jury give explanations for its decisions147—should be required when an anonymous jury or a confidential jury is empaneled. Anonymous jurors would be required to give their
conclusions regarding the verdict, what considerations led to
that conclusion, why they were or were not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, and any other considerations that guided
their decision-making.148 Reasoned verdicts, importantly, protect both the public’s interest in legitimate verdicts and the
defendant’s right to a fair trial by safeguarding against any
arbitrary and capricious actions by the jury.149 In this way,
even though the public might be faced with an anonymous
jury, they nevertheless have the reasons regarding their deci141

See id.
See United States v. Harris, 763 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2014).
143
See United States v. Sonin, 167 F. Supp. 3d 971, 974–75 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
144
See Harris, 763 F.3d at 886.
145
See State v. Rodriguez, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0659, 2017 WL 443528, at *2–8
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017) (analyzing what kind of anonymous jury a lower court
empaneled).
146
See Fischman, supra note 123, at 45.
147
See Richard L. Lippke, The Case for Reasoned Criminal Trial Verdicts, 22
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 313, 313–15 (2009).
148
See id. at 315–16.
149
See id. at 319.
142

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN602.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 27

8-NOV-18

A JURY OF YOUR [REDACTED]

12:51

1647

sion, which allows for public debate and deliberation that allows “judgments [to] find acceptance in the community.”150 To
be sure, reasoned verdicts in criminal trials, akin to special
verdicts, implicate the constitutional right to have a jury render
a final verdict.151 Juries, as the argument goes, must remain
independent and flexible in their pursuit of justice; requiring
explanations from the juries risks burdening those aims.152
But there is empirical research finding that when written findings are required, jurors feel more informed and confident in
the verdict reached.153 Moreover, there is a distinction between safeguarding juries’ independence and requiring findings regarding specific elements of a crime; here, a jury’s
independence is not necessarily extinguished because they ultimately retain the power to render a guilty or not guilty verdict
regardless of the elements of the crime.154 Indeed, there is
another key benefit behind reasoned verdicts: accountability.
Reasoned verdicts emphasize responsibility among individuals,
and behoove the individual to take agency for their own decisions, effectively blunting some of the detrimental effects of
deindividuation.155 By putting the impetus on the individual
juror to provide their own reasons behind their decision, reasoned verdicts stymie the effects of social loafing—because the
juror must provide their own reasons behind their decision—
and groupthink—because there is less of a chance that the
juror will simply and uncritically adopt the decision-making
processes of the majority. A more developed record is an additional boon, facilitating public debate over a decision or bolstering a record for purposes of an appellate challenge, should
the information be released.
B. An Example: Cases of Law Enforcement Violence
Applying this Note’s proposed solution to an increasingly
prominent context is instructive. In recent years, there has
150

See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522 (1995); United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180–81 (1st Cir. 1969).
152
See Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 (“[T]he jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more than logic.”).
153
See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 49–51 (1994).
154
See Caisa Elizabeth Royer, Note, The Disobedient Jury: Why Lawmakers
Should Codify Jury Nullification, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1401, 1410–13 (2017) (discussing the jury’s “inescapable” power to nullify the law).
155
See CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 72 (suggesting jury innovations like written juror instructions, juror notetaking, and special verdicts as a means to ameliorate jurors’ cognitive limitations); Baumeister et al., supra note 129, at 8.
151
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been a rise in high-profile, police-related deaths, particularly of
black Americans, and anonymous juries have subsequently
been empaneled.156 These trials typically entail expansive and
high-profile publicity, including public demonstrations.157
Generally, these cases involve police officers who have not been
involved in organized crime, have not previously attempted to
interfere with the judicial process, and have not previously participated in a group with the capacity to harm jurors. Indeed,
the officers involved in the death of Freddie Gray exemplify the
typical officer; all have years of experience serving in law enforcement.158 Yet in the case of one of the police officers
charged in Freddie Gray’s death, the judge ordered an anonymous jury because of “intense media scrutiny” that might expose jurors to “unwanted publicity or harassment.”159
Applying the majority federal test for anonymous juries in
this context—that is, based on the amount of publicity and not
concerns over juror safety—means that a finding of high-profile
publicity is enough to anonymize information from both the
parties and the public. In other words, the parties’ access to
jurors’ identities is a collateral casualty of high-profile publicity. The prosecution is stymied from advantages conferred by
juror information not because a defendant poses a risk to juror
safety that justifies an anonymous jury but because of highprofile publicity. But the Seventh Circuit’s approach would
result in a materially different outcome. Under the Seventh
Circuit’s approach, if an anonymous jury—that is, a jury whose
information is withheld from the parties—is sought, the court
would use the majority federal test and likely find that an
anonymous jury is not warranted because the likelihood of
juror harm and resultant harm to the judicial process from the
defendant is absent.160 A confidential jury, however, would
likely be empaneled; the sheer amount of national publicity in
156

See Johnson, supra note 15.
Id.
158
Paul Schwartzman, Accused Officers Have Wide Range of Experience,
WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/who-are-thepolice-officers-charged-in-the-death-of-freddie-gray/2015/05/01/dde6bc2ef01f-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4ND-22QB].
159
Maryland v. Porter, No. 115141037, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Dec. 3,
2015).
160
In fact, the police-officer defendants here are not dissimilar to the policeofficer defendant in United States v. Sanchez. There, the Fifth Circuit found that
an anonymous jury was not warranted where a police officer, accused of coercing
women to engage in various sexual acts, was not involved in organized crime nor
belonged to a group with the capacity to harm jurors. United States v. Sanchez,
74 F.3d 562, 562–65 (5th Cir. 1996).
157
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these cases overcomes the presumption in favor of disclosure of
judicial records. Crucially, a confidential jury withholds juror
information from the public, but not the parties—a significant
difference compared to an anonymous jury because juror information is a key consideration in police violence cases.161 Additionally, reasoned verdicts aid jurors both in forming their own
opinions in such a charged trial and fostering accountability
for the ultimate verdict reached.
CONCLUSION
Anonymous juries are a potent tool. Originating from a
trial judge’s concern over juror safety against a defendant involved in organized crime, they have spread across federal and
state courts in cases far removed from the paradigmatic organized-crime case. Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the practice, it is likely that anonymous juries are here to
stay. Their usefulness in facilitating trials involving not only
organized crime but also heavy publicity have made them an
ideal tool in the trial judge’s toolbox. And bastions traditionally
against the practice, like New York, appear to be on the verge of
reconsidering their long-held proscriptions against anonymous
juries. But there are concerns regarding the defendant’s presumption of innocence, the parties’ trial strategy, the court’s
broad discretion, the public’s interest in the legitimacy of verdicts, and the jury’s accountability with regards to anonymous
decision-making. By adopting the Seventh Circuit’s test that
demarcates between anonymous and confidential juries and
requiring reasoned verdicts when an anonymous jury is empaneled, anonymous juries may yet be an “inspired, trusted,
and effective” instrument of justice.162

161
See Michael Wines, In Police Shootings, Finding Jurors Who Will Say ‘Not
Guilty,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/
police-shootings-trial-jury.html [https://perma.cc/MP99-YXQD].
162
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).

